AI in Morocco's 2026 Elections: Legal Framework…

Morocco will elect the 395 members of its House of Representatives on 23 September 2026. The official campaign runs from 10 to 22 September. It is the first legislative election in Morocco held under electoral rules that refer explicitly to artificial intelligence.

This note summarises the legal framework that applies to the use of AI during the electoral period, describes how EuroMedAI is observing the use of AI by political parties and candidates, and presents the National Task Force on the use of AI, launched on 31 July 2026 with civil society leaders, of which EuroMedAI is a member.

Key dates

15 August to 22 September: electoral period for radio and television, as defined by HACA
31 August to 9 September: filing of candidacies
10 to 22 September: official campaign
23 September: polling day

The legal framework

The rules relevant to AI in the 2026 elections are spread across several texts and fall under different authorities: the courts and the public prosecution for electoral offences, the CNDP for personal data, and HACA for radio and television.

Constitutional principles

The 2011 Constitution sets the principles against which these rules are read. Article 11 establishes free, sincere and transparent elections as the basis of the legitimacy of democratic representation. Article 24 protects private life, Article 25 guarantees freedom of opinion and expression, and Article 28 guarantees freedom of the press.

Electoral offences: Organic Law No. 53.25

Organic Law No. 53.25 amends Organic Law No. 27.11 on the House of Representatives. The House of Representatives adopted the bill on 1 December 2025 by 164 votes to 9, with 41 abstentions. The Constitutional Court found it consistent with the Constitution in Decision No. 259/25 of 24 December 2025, and it was promulgated by Dahir No. 1.25.70 of 16 January 2026.

The amended law names “artificial intelligence tools” among the means by which several electoral offences can be committed, alongside social networks, open broadcast networks, electronic platforms, internet-based applications and information systems.

Article	Conduct	Penalty
39	Publishing or distributing campaign announcements, leaflets or other electoral documents on polling day	3 to 6 months’ imprisonment and a fine of MAD 20,000–50,000
51	Spreading false news, false rumours or other fraudulent means to divert votes or to lead voters to abstain	2 to 5 years and MAD 50,000–100,000
51 bis (new)	Distributing a composite of a person’s words or image without their consent, or false news, allegations or fabricated documents, with intent to harm the private life of a voter or candidate or to defame them	2 to 5 years and MAD 50,000–100,000
51 bis (new)	Creating content containing false or falsified material with intent to undermine the integrity and sincerity of electoral operations	2 to 5 years and MAD 50,000–100,000
53	Disrupting voting or undermining the freedom to vote, including by distributing digital content	2 to 5 years and MAD 50,000–100,000
67	Altering results or committing other fraud at polling or counting stations, before, during or after the vote	2 to 5 years and MAD 50,000–100,000

Article 39 also penalises public officials who, while on duty, distribute candidates’ programmes or campaign material by any of the same means, with 6 months’ to 1 year’s imprisonment and a fine of MAD 50,000–100,000. Under Article 38 of the amended law, alternative sentences cannot be imposed for the misdemeanours in this chapter.

Both offences in Article 51 bis require specific intent: to harm privacy or defame, or to undermine the integrity and sincerity of the vote. During the debate in the House of Representatives, opposition members proposed deleting part of Article 51 bis, arguing that it could restrict freedom of expression. The Government did not accept the amendment, and the Constitutional Court subsequently found the law as a whole consistent with the Constitution.

The Penal Code

Article 447-2 of the Penal Code, introduced in 2018 by Law No. 103.13, applies outside the electoral context as well. It penalises distributing, by any means including information systems, a montage of a person’s words or image without their consent, as well as false allegations intended to harm a person’s privacy or to defame them.

Campaign spending: Decree No. 2.26.279

Decree No. 2.26.279, amending Decree No. 2.16.668 of 10 August 2016, sets the spending ceiling at MAD 600,000 per candidate. For the first time, it caps digital campaign spending at one third of the campaign budget. Digital spending is defined to include social networks, artificial intelligence tools, and any electronic platform or application that relies on the internet or software.

Personal data: Law No. 09-08 and CNDP guidance

At the end of August 2026, the National Commission for the Control of Personal Data Protection (CNDP) issued guidance to political parties on the processing of voters’ data under Law No. 09-08. It recalls that parties must:

declare any processing of personal data to the CNDP before it begins (Article 12);
collect data fairly, for specified purposes, and retain it no longer than necessary (Article 3);
obtain explicit consent before processing data that reveals political opinions (Article 21);
obtain prior consent before direct prospecting by electronic means (Article 10);
apply the law’s requirements to subcontractors and to transfers of data abroad (Articles 23, 25, 43 and 44).

The CNDP also asks that all content produced with AI be identified as such, citing Article 447-2 of the Penal Code and Articles 39, 51 and 53 of the organic law. The guidance does not prohibit AI-generated content. The CNDP has opened a helpline, 3020, for questions from the public during the electoral process.

Radio and television: HACA Decision No. 50-26

On 16 June 2026, the High Authority for Audiovisual Communication (HACA) adopted Decision No. 50-26 on radio and television coverage of the electoral period. It prohibits the broadcast of falsified or AI-generated electoral content liable to mislead the public or undermine the integrity of democratic debate. AI-generated content used for educational or explanatory purposes must carry a clear, permanent and unambiguous notice that AI was used. Broadcasters must also act against disinformation liable to undermine the integrity of the elections. The decision applies to radio and television services.

Election observation: Law No. 30.11

Independent and neutral election observation is governed by Law No. 30.11. A special accreditation commission chaired by the National Human Rights Council (CNDH) met on 4 and 7 September 2026 and accredited 3,006 observers from national and international organisations.

AI is part of the observation mandate in 2026. The CNDH has announced that, for the first time, its observers will monitor the circulation of audio and visual content generated or manipulated by AI, using a dedicated reporting form and a central unit that verifies digital content. Civil society observers have taken a similar approach. The campaign observation form of the Collectif Associatif pour l’Observation des Élections (CAOE), which planned to deploy about 1,700 observers, includes a section on media, digital communication and AI. Its questions follow the offences in the organic law and HACA’s labelling rule: false news spread online to sway or discourage voters; fabricated content targeting a voter or candidate; a person’s image, voice or words used in altered content without this being clear to the audience; AI used to create or alter false electoral content; missing AI notices on radio and television; digital content that incites violence or obstructs the vote; paid digital advertising; and campaigning that continues online after the legal deadline. For each incident, observers record whether the party or candidate who benefits can be identified.

A general AI law

The electoral provisions are not part of a general law on AI. A draft framework law known as Digital X.0, covering data governance, digital identity and interoperability, was reported in late 2025 to be under review at the General Secretariat of the Government.

Questions to follow during the campaign

Several practical questions will be tested as the campaign proceeds:

Labelling. Published summaries of the CNDP guidance do not indicate what form labels should take, where they should appear, or when edited content counts as AI-generated.
Online content. HACA’s decision covers radio and television. Content on social networks and messaging services is addressed mainly through the criminal provisions above and through data-protection law.
Responsibility. Commentary on the Constitutional Court’s decision has noted that the law does not specify how responsibility is shared between those who create content, those who operate the AI tools used, and those who re-share it.
Attribution. The author of synthetic content is often unknown. Observation forms ask whether the beneficiary can be identified, which is not the same as establishing who produced the content.
Verification. Establishing that content was generated or altered by AI usually requires technical analysis beyond what can be seen in the field. The CNDH has set up a central unit to verify digital content reported by its observers.
Accounting. How AI-related services will be identified in campaign accounts under the digital spending cap.

Observing the use of AI by political parties

Through its Mediterranean AI Observatory pillar, EuroMedAI is documenting how political parties and candidates use AI in their public communication during the campaign. The observation concerns practices, not political positions. It does not assess programmes, compare the merits of parties or comment on results.

It covers:

Synthetic content: AI-generated or AI-edited images, video, audio and cloned voices in campaign material;
Disclosure: whether such material is identified as AI-generated in parties’ and candidates’ own online channels, as the CNDP has asked;
Languages: the use of AI to produce or translate content in Arabic, Darija, Amazigh, French and other languages;
Inclusion: AI-generated content targeting women candidates, and the use of AI to make campaign content accessible to persons with disabilities;
Voter contact: chatbots, automated messaging and other AI-assisted tools used to communicate with voters;
Digital advertising: AI-assisted production and targeting of paid content, to the extent visible from public sources.

The observation is designed to complement incident-based election observation. Where observers record suspected violations, EuroMedAI documents the wider pattern of AI use, including lawful uses such as translation and accessibility.

EuroMedAI will share its findings with the National Task Force described below and publish a summary after the electoral period.

National Task Force on the Use of AI

EuroMedAI is a member of the National Task Force on the use of AI, launched on 31 July 2026 with civil society leaders in Morocco. The Task Force works in collaboration with the CNDH and CAOE. It brings together three types of expertise:

Technical experts, on how AI systems are built, deployed and assessed;
Civil society representatives, on citizen participation, human rights, media and the public interest;
Legal experts, on electoral, data-protection, media and criminal law.

The Task Force provides a common space to examine how AI is used in the electoral process and in public life, and to inform public discussion of the rules that govern it.

EuroMedAI’s contribution includes:

findings from its observation of the campaign;
comparative experience from other Euro-Mediterranean countries on AI, elections and information integrity;
technical and methodological input to the Task Force’s work.

Information on the Task Force’s membership and work programme will be published separately.

Organisations and experts who wish to follow or contribute to this work can contact EuroMedAI at contact@euromedai.org.

Sources

Organic Law No. 53.25 amending Organic Law No. 27.11 on the House of Representatives, Official Bulletin No. 7478 (Arabic)
House of Representatives vote on Bill No. 53.25, Hespress (Arabic)
Commentary on Constitutional Court Decision No. 259/25, Takamoul Center (Arabic)
HACA Decision No. 50-26 on the 2026 legislative elections, HACA (French)
CNDP rules on personal data and AI for the 2026 elections, Le Matin (French)
CNDP guidance to political parties, Morocco World News
Decree No. 2.26.279 on campaign spending, Aujourd’hui le Maroc (French)
Election date and campaign calendar, The North Africa Post
Candidacy filing period, Industries du Maroc
CNDH accreditation of 3,006 observers, Telquel (French)
CNDH observers to monitor AI-generated content, L’ODJ (French)
Election observation documents for the 23 September 2026 legislative elections, including the campaign observation form, CAOE and CNDH (Arabic)
CAOE deployment of observers for the 2026 elections, LesEco.ma (French)
Digital X.0 draft framework law, Ecofin Agency

AI in Morocco's 2026 Elections: Legal Framework, Observation and a National Task Force